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COMPUTATION OF FUTURE DAMAGES:
A VIEW FROM THE BENCH
WiIAmi B.. LAwLESS, JR.*
Recognizing that speculation inheres in lump-sum verdicts for future
losses, Justice Lawless explores some practical computation problems which
magnify this speculation. The author examines the plight of a jury which
must decide upon a discount factor, reduce a lump-sum award to its present
worth, and perhaps wrestle with a taxation adjustment. Concluding that
this practice results in unrealistic burdens on juries and injustice to litigants,
Justice Lawless recommends that if we are to continue the lump-sum
method, some of the guesswork should be obviated by special findings which
leave mathematical calculations on jury-found facts with the judge.
INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the century the United States Supreme Court held
that a common-law action could not be maintained in a court of the
United States against a Mexican railroad, incorporated in Colorado,
for the wrongful death in Mexico of an American switchman.' Mr.
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, said that the American court
should refuse to administer a Mexican statutory rule of damages
which provided compensation in the form of scheduled, periodic pay-
ments instead of the lump-sum award traditional to American jury
verdicts.2
While the case is of primary interest for students of conflict of laws,
it neatly contrasts two wholly different remedies in computing dam-
ages for future loss: the Mexican periodic payment based on what
does happen in the future, and the American lump-sum payment based
on what may happen in the future. The Supreme Court opined that
justice to the defendant would not permit the substitution of a lump
sum provided under Texas law for the periodic payments which the
Mexican statute required. As Holmes put it: "[T] o reduce a liability
conditioned as this was to a lump sum would be to leave the whole
matter to a mere guess."3 Yet, is it not true that every lump-sum
*Justice, New York Supreme Court. A.B., University of Buffalo; LL.B., University
of Notre Dame School of Law; LL.M., Harvard University Law School.
1 Slater v. Mexican Natl R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
2Id. at 128 (dictum).
3 Id. at 128. (Emphasis added.)
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verdict is in a sense predicated upon a chain 3f guesses or, more ac-
curately, educated estimates? Future loss to a plaintiff cannot be com-
puted with precision when the elements of loss are variable and un-
known. Plaintiff may or may not require future surgery, he may or
may not require future nursing care, his future earnings may or may
not decrease, and finally, plaintiff may live to his expectancy, exceed it,
or never realize it. Each element of future damage is necessarily based
upon the jury's prediction as to what will occur in the future.
It is interesting that more than fifty years have passed since
Holmes' observation, and no perceptible chorus for reform has been
heard to urge greater precision in computing awards of damage for
future expense and future loss.
Since the cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is
that of compensation for injury caused plaintiff by defendant's breach
of duty, it is regrettable that the common-law system and most state
statutes are so tightly wedded to a lump-sum judgment in the typical
negligence case. While the single recovery rule may be practical in
terms of efficient court disposition, it leaves much to be desired in terms
of basic justice. This is true because, first, the average jury is con-
fronted with prophecy and, second, the successful litigant may im-
providently dispose of the lump sum intended to substitute for future
earnings.4 It is as Professors Harper and James suggest "both capri-
cious and inflexible." '5
The obvious alternative to lump-sum recovery is an award of peri-
odic payments such as are made under workmen's compensation laws,0
but over fifty years' experience in the administration of such laws in
New York has not shown this alternative to be simple or self-operat-
ing. Indeed, it "has proved to be infinitely more elaborate, extensive,
and controversial than had been imagined."
Given the continued presence of the lump-sum award, there should
be methods to increase the precision of its operation. Today trial
courts extend themselves to hear every relevant item of proof so that
they may judiciously resolve questions of liability on an empirical and
4 A study by the United States Railroad Retirement Board for the years 1938-1940
concluded that the disposition of lump-sum settlements does not assure a stable sub-
stitute for wage loss. 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs § 25.2, at 1303-04 (19S6).
5 Id. at 1304.
6 See, e.g., N.Y. WoRKMEN's COMP. LAW § 208.
7 Gelhorn & Lauer, Administration of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law,
37 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 564, 600 (1962).
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dispassionate basis. But at the very climax of trial, when it comes to
computing future loss, a somewhat cavalier attitude takes hold. The
typical charge to the jury considering an award for future damages
urges the jury to make an award for the diminution of plaintiff's earn-
ing capacity on the basis of (1) his earnings prior to injury, (2) the
condition of his health, his prospect for advancement, and the prob-
abilities, before his injury, of future earnings, and (3) his life ex-
pectancy. The trial judge, in his charge, will often exhort the jurors to
contrast the state of the plaintiff's future life after the accident with
what it would have been if there had been no accident-surely a task
calling for divine insight. Ordinarily, this instruction will follow an
explanation of complicated principles of negligence, whether ordinary,
statutory, contributory, active or passive, and perhaps even an explana-
tion of the ad hoc employee rule and reference to statutes and com-
missioners' regulations. After these basic points are covered, the jury
is then instructed to assess damages which will fairly and justly com-
pensate the plaintiff, to consider and compute future loss, to decide
upon a discount factor which will reduce it to present value, and to
reduce the award to present value. In some jurisdictions the court may
add adjustments for inflation and taxation.
It is the purpose of this article to examine some of the practical
problems presented in computing future damages under present law
and to suggest some available judicial techniques for improving the
approach to assessing future damages.
COMPUTATION PROBLEMS
PRESENT WORTH
In the typical negligence case where plaintiff is compensated in a
lump sum for loss of future earnings and for expenses to be incurred
in the future, he is awarded a sum of money now for income which he
would, without an accident, have received at various future dates.
However, where the jury awards a sum of money equal to the total
decrease in plaintiff's earning capacity without reducing it to present
worth, it ignores the fact that money in hand has earning power: In
a majority of jurisdictions, therefore, the jury must be instructed to
compute the total loss due to injury and then to reduce the total to
reflect the present value of the award.8
8 See Annot, 154 A.L.R. 796 (1945) ; Annot., 105 A.L.R. 234 (1936) ; Annot., 77 A.L.R.
1439 (1932). Cases decided under the Federal Employers' Liability Act must be deter-
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The present value rule is based upon the rationale that the plaintiff
is entitled only to a sum of money which will over his lifetime compen-
sate him for his decreased future earnings and expenses. The courts
in some jurisdictions consider a present award based on loss-per-year
times work expectancy a form of overcompensation. It has been said
that the verdict should take into account the value of both the prin-
cipal in hand and interest to be earned thereon as compensation for the
decreased earning capacity of the plaintiff.0 The goal of the personal
injury award is to give the plaintiff that sum of money which, if in-
vested in reasonably safe investments, will return the amount of the
decrease in plaintiff's earning capacity during the period of his injury
where a temporary disability is involved, or during the period of his
work life where a total disability occurs.'0
Explaining "present value" to the jury imports further complication.
The-trial court cannot be expected to provide the jury with a law school
education within the ordinary limits of its charge and then make
mathematicians of them when it comes to reducing the full verdict to
present worth. Still, when such a charge is given, several items must
mined in accord with principles of law announced by the United States Supreme Court.
In Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916), the Court held it error not to
instruct on present value. Id. at 491. This federal rule has been followed in FELA
and other cases in at least twenty-three states and the District of Columbia. E.g., Globe
Furniture Co. v. Gately, 51 App. D.C. 367, 279 Fed. 1005 (1922) ; Wong Kit v. Crescent
Creamery Co., 87 Cal. App. 563, 262 Pac. 481 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927); Western At. R.R. v.
Bennet, 47 Ga. App. 629, 171 S.E. 187 (1933) ; Hart v. Hinkley, 215 Iowa 915, 247 N.W.
259 (1933). A federal court of appeals held it was prejudicial error under New Jersey
law to refuse to charge present value on request. Trent v. Atlantic City Elec. Co., 334
F.2d 847, 867-68 (3d Cir. 1964).
No New York case has "been discovered which holds that in a negligence action the
jury must be instructed to reduce to present value the damages awarded for loss of
future earnings or for future expenses. However, a present value instruction was not
disapproved in an FELA case tried in that state. McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960). In addition, the earning power
of money has been considered in New York in determining excessiveness of a verdict,
one element of which was loss of earnings. Greck v. New York Cent. R.R., 21 App. Div.
2d 776, 250 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1964); Campbell v. North Am. Brewing Co., 22 App. Div. 414,
47 N.Y.S. 992 (1897); Wolfe v. General Mills, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Finally, the New York Court of Appeals has held that the damages of a discharged
employee for contract breach are measured by the present worth of the obligation to
pay wages at a future time. Hollwedel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 263 N.Y. 95, 188 N.E. 266
(1933).
9 Stewart v. Atlantic Gulf & Pac. Co., 9 F. Supp. 344, 347 (S.D. Fla. 1934).
10 22 AM. JU. 2d Damages § 96 (1965).
be considered in presenting this rule to the jury: (1) the period of
time for which compensation may be given, (2) the use of mortality or
life expectancy tables, (3) the measure of decreased earning capacity,
(4) the use of actuarial tables or the testimony of an actuary, and (5)
the selection of an interest rate.
In one case, a New Hampshire trial court instructed the jury as
follows:
In estimating the probable expectancy of life of the child . . . you are to. take
into consideration his age, health, physical condition and appearance of health
of his parents. Of course, in determining what compensation should be given for
the above factors, you should award only the present worth of any elements
of damage."1
The appellate court was of the opinion that this instruction did not
sufficiently explain the words "present worth" and Wrote:
It is not to be assumed that average jurors have mathematical knowledge
sufficient for an understanding of the words, or enough skill to calculate present
worth. They are entitled to know that present worth of damages to be suffered
in the future is such sum of money in hand as with a proper rate of interest
compounded will yield the sum to be obtained at the conclusion of the period
in contemplation. The rate of interest taken may be the average current rate
according to standard investment practices.' 2
In that case a new trial was awarded in order that the jury be given
such instructions as would fully explain to them the functions they were
to perform.
It should be emphasized that the error of omission of the pfesent
value charge does not always warrant reversal. In Gleason v. Lowe, 13
the trial judge failed to limit the future damages to present worth. The
error was recognized upon a motion for a new trial, and on appeal, the
court held: "Such an error is reflected in the amount of the verdict
only, and, if we can cure the error without injury, we will do so ...
Whether the error calls for reversal or mere remittitur is a question
dependent for answer upon . . . the demands of justice in a particular
case.' 4 However, there are numerous cases, particularly in actions
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, where it has been
held reversible error not to charge present worth. 5
11 Humphreys v. Ash, 90 N.H. 223, 230, 6 A.2d 436, 440 (1939). (Emphasis added.)
12 Id. at 230, 6 A.2d at 441.
Is 232 Mich. 300, 205 N.W. 199 (1925).
14 Id. at 306, 205 N.W. at 201.
15 Annot, 77 A.L.R. 1439 (1932).
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A common ground for refusing relief on appeal from a verdict
rendered in the absence of a present value charge is the failure of
counsel for the defendant to request such an instruction. As a prac-
tical matter, defense counsel are unlikely in a close liability case to offer
the foundation proof upon which a present value instruction should
be based. To do so is to suggest to the jury that the defendant believes
there may be liability. Moreover, numerous members of the trial bar
believe that such a charge is confusing to the jury and that on balance,
omission of instruction on present value is substantially offset by omis-
sion to charge concerning the effects of inflation. In fact, request is
not frequently made in New York for a present value instruction, and
most trial judges believe that none should be given unless requested
and unless the necessary underlying proof with respect to interest rates
and discount factor is in evidence. Without such proof there is no basis
for the charge, for "it is not to be assumed that the average jurors
have mathematical knowledge sufficient . . to calculate present
worth."'
RATE OF DISCOUNT
In states where the jury is instructed to adjust for present value, the
rate of discount varies. In the leading case of Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
v. Kelly,' 7 it was held that the trial court should have instructed the
jury that damages for the deprivation of future benefits were to be
based on the present cash value of such benefits. The Supreme Court
said:
We do not mean to say that the discount should be at what is commonly
called the "legal rate" of interest; that is, the rate limited by law, beyond which
interest is prohibited. It may be that such rates are not obtainable upon invest-
ments on safe securities, at least without the exercise of financial experience
and skill in the administration of the fund; and it is evident that the compensa-
-tion should be awarded upon a basis that does not call upon the beneficiaries
to exercise such skill, for where this is necessarily employed the interest return
is in part earned by the investor rather than by the investment. This, however,
is a matter that ordinarily may be adjusted by scaling the rate of interest to be
adopted in computing the present value of the future benefits .. . .s
The Court recognized that as a rule the best and safest investments,
and those which require the least care, yield only a moderate return. 0
16 Humphreys v. Ash, 90 N.H. 223, 230, 6 A.2d 436, 441 (1939).
17 241 U.S. 485 (1916).
18 Id. at 490-91.
19 Ibid.
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In Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry.'v. Moser,20 where the trialcourt instructed
the jury to award the present value of the loss without stating any rule
for its ascertainment, it was held error. Yet in a later case, a vague
instruction that the loss of future benefits should be reduced to its
present cash value "upon a rate of interest which you fix as reasonable,
just, and right under all the circumstances," 21 was approved. 22 An in-
struction that the jury should arrive at present worth by discounting it
at a reasonable discount, "such sum as you are to consider reasonably
safe in arriving at the earning power of money," was held not to be
reversible error.23 It has also been held that no fixed rate is required
but that "the jury should determine from the evidence what interest
could be fairly expected from safe investments which a person of ordi-
nary prudence, but without particular financial experience or skill,
could make in that locality." 24
With the possible exception of persons advanced in age and those
whose worklife expectancy is short, there would normally be fluctua-
tions in future earnings. It does not appear to be sufficient, therefore,
simply to give a jury a compound discount table, for such a table is
predicated on a constant annual sum. In theory, the proper method is
to determine for each year the amount that would have been earned
and the applicable interest rate, discount the earnings for a year based
on the number of years in the future that it would have been payable,
and then total the discounted sums for all of the years that it, is found
that the loss will continue. Yet, this procedure was criticized in New
York as being "impossibly difficult" :26
Though [the jury] . . . must make due allowance for the difference between the
value of future payments, they cannot be required to make apportionment of
uncertain deductions against each payment or to apply with exactitude tables
of . . . discount to uncertain sums. All that can be required of them is to
pass upon the evidence and to make reasonable allowance for each factor
entering into the determination of the entire damage.27
20 275 U.S. 133 (1927).
2 1 Western & Ad. R.R. v. Hughes, 37 Ga. App. 771, 773, 142 S.E. 185, 188 (1928).22 Western & At. R.R. v. Hughes, 278 U.S. 496 (1929).
23 Birmingham Belt R.R. v. Hendrix, 215 Ala. 285, 288, 110 So. 312, 314 (1926), cert.
denied, 273 U.S. 758 (1927).
24 Southern Pac. Co. v. Klinge, 65 F.2d 85, 87 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 657
(1933).
25 Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 191), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 989 and 370 U.S. 937 (1962).
2 0 Hollwedel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 263 N.Y. 95, 188 N.E. 266 (1933).
2 7 Id. at 105, 188 N.E. at 269.
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The Restatement of Torts suggests 'that the rate of discount be
"based upon the current return upon long-term investments if the
prospective losses are long continued. ' 28 In many states other than
New York it is left to the jury to determine and use the rate which
persons without financial skill can safely secure on investments,2 al-
though in some states it is the "average current rates according to
standard investment practices" that are to be used.80 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated that in any event the mini-
mum discount factor should be four per cent."'
COST OF ANNUITY
In some jurisdictions, the defendant will attempt to show the value
of lost future earnings by introducing in evidence the cost of providing
an annuity for the injured person. In a leading Florida case permitting
the admission of annuity cost,3 2 the court after recounting general rules
of damagesa stated that "courts in this country have generally ap-
proved a sum that would purchase an annuity equal to the value of
the pecuniary aid which the dependents would have derived from the
deceased, in other words, the present worth of such an amount as
would accrue to the beneficiaries based on his or her life expectancy."8 14
There is lack of agreement, however, as to whether under proper in-
struction the jury should be given evidence of these costs.8
2 8
, R'jrA'TEMENT, ToRTs § 924, comment d (1939).
29E.g., O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959); Southern Pac. Co.
v. Klnge, 65 F.2d 85 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 657 (1933); Western & Atl.
R.R. v. Townsend, 36 Ga. App. 70, 135 S.E. 439 (1929); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
Callahan, 209 Ky. 348, 272 S.W. 880 (1925).
30 Humphreys v. Ash, 90 N.H. 223, 230, 6 A.2d 436, 441 (1939).
31 Conte v. Flota Mercante del Estado, 277 F.2d 664, 670 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Alexander v.
Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 271 F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1959).
82 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Ellis, 105 Fla. 186, 140 S.E. 918 (1932).
33The court pointed out that in assessing future damages for wrongful death, the
jury is
not limited to a consideration of the age and probable life expectancy of the
dependents, neither are they limited to a consideration of the age, earning power,
and probable life expectancy of the deceased. They may consider the probable in-
creased needs of the dependents and the probabilities of the deceased contributing to
such increased needs.
Id. at 188, 140 S.E. at 919.
34 Ibid.
85 A number of courts have upheld the use of annuity costs as a factor in fixing personal
injury damages. See St. Louis Iron Mt. & So. Ry. v. Needham, 52 Fed. 371 (8th Cir.
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Problems exist in permitting admission of annuity cost. In most
jurisdictions, the annuity cost includes overhead and profit for the
insurance company which are not items of damage and, secondly, these
costs do not reflect the particular, life expectancy and data of the par-
ticular plaintiff. Where annuity costs are used in fixing or analyzing
damages, it has been held that a distinction should be drawn between
refund annuities and straight annuities, it being proper to use the cost
of the latter but not the cost of the former.
INCOME TAXES
In McT4eeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,36 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that refusal of the trial court to instruct the
jury that, in calculating future loss of earnings, they should consider
only the employee's net income after deduction of income taxes was
not error,8 7 although such an instruction might be proper in the case of
a plaintiff with great earning power.38 The court, acknowledging that
an award for personal injuries is not taxable income to the plaintiff
under federal law or under New York law, also held that while an
instruction that the jury should not add to the award any amount for
taxes would be proper, the verdict herein did not indicate that the jury
had included such allowance in the. award. Thus, failure to give the
cautionary instruction below was not reversible error.8 9
Judge Friendly, writing for the majority, set out the rationale for
the court's first holding. In cases of total disability, loss of earning
power is determined usually by considering normal future earning
1892); McNair v. Berger, 92 Mont. 441, 15 P.2d 834 (1932); Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry.
v. Willie, 53 Tex. 318 (1880); Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Hampton, 358 S.W.2d 690
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Dunphy v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 82 W. Va. 123, 95 S.E. S163 (1918);
Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 1454 (1954). Contra, Farmers Union Federated Co-op. Shipping
Ass'n v. McChesney, 251 F.2d 44-1 (8th Cir. 1958) (annuity includes profit to insurer);
Phillips v. London S.W. Ry., [1879] 5 Q.B. 78 (annuity fails to encompass contingency
such as recipient's early death); Bateman v. County of Middlesex, [1913] 27 Ont. 122,
6 D.L.R. 533. See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 1454 (1954).
80282 F.2d 34. (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
8 7 Id. at 35.
8 8 Id. at 38.
39 1d. at 40. Plaintiff brought a personal injury action under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. His medical expenses were in excess of $10,000; his earnings loss. to the
date of trial was $14,000; and his future earnings potential discounted approached
$100,000. The $87,000 verdict for the plaintiff did not indicate to the court that the
jury had included an allowance for income tax on the award.
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power, life expectancy, and the discount factor. Judge Friendly pointed
out the difficulty the jury would have in estimating future income tax
liability on the sum allocated for loss of future wages. Plaintiff was a
thirty-six-year-old bachelor at the time of the accident. He was earn-
ing 4,800 dollars a year. The court demonstrated that the jury would
have to determine not what McWeeney's tax was on 4,800 dollars,
but what it would be over his expectancy. In the lower brackets the
amount of tax and its percentage relation to earnings are greatly
affected by the number of exemptions. If McWeeney married and
filed a joint return, his annual tax would be decreased from 773 dollars
to 620 dollars per annum. If his lady brought two children with her,
or bore them, the tax would be cut in half to 380 dollars. A tax
saving of 110 dollars would follow with every child, so that a total of
five would make the tax nominal. The court queried whether the jury
in each case was to speculate or hear testimony on the procreative pro-
clivities and potentialities of the plaintiff and his spouse. The court
concluded that it would adhere to its prior ruling in Stokes v. United
States,40 which denied a deduction for income taxes against the United
States under the Suits in Admiralty Act as "too conjectural." 4'
Chief Judge Lumbard, dissenting in McWeeney, would have re-
versed because of the trial judge's refusal "to advise the jury that any
sum awarded the plaintiff is not subject to tax." 42 To Judge Lumbard
this refusal necessitated a new trial, as the requested charge was simple
and required no calculation. He also disagreed with Judge Friendly on
the "net income" charge, which he felt should be granted where the
defense has presented some foundation for it.43 Chief Judge Lumbard
opined that the majority opinion greatly overestimated the burden on
the jury from such a charge-all it required was estimation of future
income loss on the basis of McWeeney's net income at the time of the
accident rather than his gross income. Chief Judge Lumbard felt that
it was beside the point to conjure up, as Judge Friendly did, all the
additional complicating factors which might arise. Since all the factors
of damage involve an element of guesswork, this element alone should
not be fatal to a net income charge. The Chief Judge would treat
McWeeney as a bachelor evermore.
40 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944).
4 1 Id. at 87.
42 McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. S70 (1960).
4 3 Id. at 41.
1140
This case again emphasizes the frustrating dilemma of attempting
to compute future damage, but leaves us with the general rule that in-
come tax is not a factor to be considered by the jury unless the plain-
tiff's earnings are in a high tax bracket, in which case an instruction to
consider income taxes may be proper.44
PROPOSED SOLUTION: SPECIAL FINDINGS
It would appear that the most workable solution to charging the
doctrine of present value is to require the jury to make a special verdict
or special findings of fact with respect to the application and rate of
disdount. This leaves the factfinding function to the jury and is the
only way in which the trial court can be assured that "reasonable allow-
ance" has been made for the discount factor. It is a constitutionally
acceptable method and one which had been used in New Hampshire for
some years.45 In the United States, submission of special interroga-
tories to accompany the general verdict is generally recognized as
proper.46 Most states authorize special interrogatories by statute and
some states even require their use.47 In Massachusetts, courts have
held that special interrogatories may be used without express statutory
provision.48 In the federal courts, submission of interrogatories is
within the broad discretion of the trial judge.49 Some states, New
York for example, have adopted the federal rule with modifications.5 0
If a special verdict or special findings are used, the trial court ap-
plies the law to fact found by the jury. The special verdict obviates
the need for charging the jury concerning complicated legal principles
with respect to present value, rate of discount, impact of annuity
value, and the effect of federal and state taxation upon the verdict. A
pattern charge for such occasion has been proposed in a recent pub-
lication dealing with jury instructions prepared by a committee of New
44 Accord, Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S, 333 F.2d 308 (2d. Cir. 1964);
Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1963).
45 E.g., Adams v. Severance, 93 N.H. 289, 41 A.2d 233 (1945) ; Thibeault v. Brown,
92 N.H. 235, 29 A.2d 461 (1942); Humphreys v. Ash, 90 N.H. 223, 6 A.2d 436 (1939).
46 See Annot., Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 469 (1910).
47 Comment, 18 U. Cm. L. Rav. 321, 323 (1950).
48 Burgess v. Giovannucci, 314 Mass. 252,49 N.E.2d 907 (1943).
49 FED. R. Cm. P. 49 (b).
50o N.Y. Crv. PPAc. LAW § 4111.
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York judges.51 Use of special findings has the added advantage that
retrial will not be required, no matter what the ultimate holdings of
the appellate court may be concerning the rate of interest to be used.
If the court rejects the rate of interest which the jury finds to be
expected from reasonably safe investments made by a person of ordi-
nary prudence, it may substitute its own rate without otherwise dis-
turbing the verdict and ordering a new trial. The court may use the
facts found in the special verdict to apply present value tables, as sug-
gested in New York Pattern Jury Instructions, as follows:
PRESENT VALUE TABLES
The variables involved in reducing future earnings to present value are (1)
the length of time the earnings would continue, (2) the rate of interest during
that period, (3) the amount estimated as earnings for each segment (year or
month) of the period. For a case in which the reduction remains constant,
the calculation, with the use of a compound discount table is quite simple.
The steps necessary are (1) determine the amount per year by which earnings
will be reduced; (2) fix the number of years the reduction will continue; (3)
fix the rate of interest; (4) using the number of years and rate of interest
fixed, ascertain from the discount table the present value of one dollar payable
51 MEYER, HENRY, LAWLESS, MARTUSCELLO & WiTMER, Naw YoRK PA Rmw JUly
INSTn UcnON-CIvIL (1965).
A lump sum received today is worth more than the same total amount paid in
installments over a period of time, because the lump sum received today can be in-
vested and will earn interest. The amount which you fix as the diminution of
plaintiff's earning capacity in the future must therefore, be reduced to present cash
value in order to make allowance for the earning power of money. I shall not
impose upon you the burden of making the mathematical calculations involved, but
in order to provide the court with the basis for making those calculations will ask
that when you report your verdict, you answer the following questions, which will
be submitted to you in writing:
(1) State the total amount included in the verdict for diminution of earning
capacity in the future.
(2) State how long you find the diminution will continue.
(3) State the breakdown of the amount referred to in (1) over the period of
years in (2) ; that is, the amount by which you find earnings will be diminished in
each year.
(4) State the rate of interest which is fairly to be expected from reasonably
safe investments made by a person of ordinary prudence but who does not have
particular financial skill or experience, and if you find that such rate will vary
during the period the diminution will continue, state the rate you fix for each
year.
Of course, the fact that those questions are asked is not to be taken as an
intimation that you should find for plaintiff or find that plaintiff is entitled to recover
for diminution of future earnings. Only if you find that he is so entitled need you
answer the questions. If you do so find, your answers will be stated on the form
which will be supplied to you and each juror will sign in the appropriate place on
the form to indicate his agreement or disagreement with the answer stated. At
least ten of the twelve of you must concur in your answers.
annually in the future; (5) multiply the number of dollars determined in step
(1) by the value per dollar determined in step (4). The difficulty with that
approach is that in almost every tort case, future earnings or the future cost
of a medical service can be expected to increase or decrease. When earnings
do vary, the proper method is to estimate the loss for each year, discount that
loss to present value based on the number of years in the future that it would
have been payable and the proper rate of interest and then total the discounted
sums for all of the years that it is found that the loss will continue .... r2
CONCLUSION
In most trial courts of the United States the matter of assessing
future damages is left to the jury after the court instructs as to how
the computation should be made and how the result should be reduced
to present value. It is obvious that the assessment of damages is in-
herently speculative. In addition, the adjustment may introduce other
variables depending upon whether the entire sum is reduced by a fixed
rate of discount or whether each year's loss is taken up separately, ad-
justed to present value, and totaled.
In difficult negligence cases we believe that it is not realistic for
the court to expect a jury to test credibility, to resolve close questions
of liability, and then to compute damages with accurancy and preci-
sion.53 We urge, therefore, that whenever possible trial courts require
the jury either to render special verdicts in which they answer specific
questions put by the court, or to answer interrogatories in addition to
the general verdict where a general verdict is taken. We believe there
is merit in having the court itself reduce gross future damage to present
value. The court is certainly in a better position to determine a rea-
sonable rate of discount and perhaps might adopt a rule stating in
advance what the rate will be where no rate is fixed by statute. The
court will be able to consider whether federal and state tax adjustments
are in order and whether serious consideration should be given to the
cost-of-annuity value.
52 Id. at 569.
5 This problem was expressly recognized in Matanuska Valley Lines, Inc. v. Neal,
255 F.2d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 1957). The Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, disapproved
of an instruction given to the jury as part of a very long set of instructions on the case
as a whole. In that case the trial judge gave the jury a formula for computing present
worth and two illustrations for its use. The court of appeals found that the form of
the charge was "unintelligible."
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These conclusions are necessarily based on the assumption that
our American trial courts will continue to employ a lump-sum verdict
rule in fixing future damages. Obviously, many of the problems de-
scribed in this article would be averted if scheduled awards were pro-
vided by statute. Mr. Justice Holmes was not far wrong when he
referred to the process as one of "mere guess."
